Recent approaches to the study of mergers and acquisitions highlight the existence of search frictions in this market and claim that golden parachutes might be an optimal contract to incentivize managers. We utilize event-study methodologies on a M&A panel dataset that comprises friendly deals, from 1990 to 2006, and …nd that: 1) Proxies for search frictions matter in the acquirer/target trade-o¤ decision and abnormal returns; and 2) the adoption of Golden Parachutes for CEOs increases the likelihood of becoming a target and the abnormal returns to acquirers. We also use exploit data on withdrawn mergers to decompose and quantify the stock price reaction between a synergy e¤ect and an information e¤ect, and …nd that the synergy e¤ect is positive for both acquirers and targets (9 and 20 percent on average, respectively), while the information e¤ect is negative for acquirers and positive for targets (-11 and 10 percent.) 
Introduction
Recent approaches to the market for corporate control have used search models as a framework for the analysis of M&A phenomena (see for instance, Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2005) and Martos-Vila (2007)). The basic aspect of this approach is modelling the frictions of the corporate control market explicitly: instead of a centralized market, it takes time and resources to …nd a match. As a result, it is easier to merge the more …rms available to buy there are, the lower the discount rate and the easier it is to identify the synergies itself, among other determinants. In particular, Martos-Vila (2007) develops a framework for the study of friendly M&As that explicitly models a …rm's decision whether to become a potential acquirer or else being exposed to being targeted. The main idea is that a manager faces the choice whether to search for potential targets and synergistic pro…ts or instead improve the current operational e¢ ciency of the …rm. The payo¤s to one or the other strategy from the manager's perspective are assumed to di¤er from their shareholders, who seek to maximize the value of the …rm. As a result of this con ‡ict, golden parachutes appear to be an optimal way to incentivize managers in equilibrium.
The model takes a market equilibrium approach so that expressions for the equilibrium mass of potential acquirers and targets are obtained, allowing us to estimate the decision whether to become an acquirer or being targeted.
This paper looks at friendly deals and tests some hypothesis based on the theoretical framework just explained. We start focusing on issues related to executive compensation, more concretely, golden parachutes (henceforth GP) and the search aspect of the model. First, we test whether the provision of golden parachutes increases (decreases) the likelihood of becoming a target (acquirer), as predicted by the theoretical model. At the same time we look at whether other variables in the model that help explain such likelihood have coe¢ cients with signs consistent with the theory. We also question, empirically, the GP optimality result by looking at whether deals where target management is provided with a golden parachute enjoy larger premiums. Next, we also measure and estimate the impact of variables intended to capture search frictions in the market for corporate control. To be more concrete, we proxy search frictions in two dimensions: geographic and business relatedness. The idea being that closer headquarters and/or more similar …rms in terms of industries in which they operate imply less search frictions.
We then present a test aimed at disentangling the two types of stock price e¤ects that arise, according to the theory, upon announcement of a deal: a synergy (value creation) e¤ect and an information e¤ect, which is the result of the assymmetry of information between managers and shareholders. The information e¤ect is negative for acquirers when merging opportunities might be exhausted and because the …rm has not improved its operational e¢ ciency in lieu of a potential merger. The market then might react negatively, overall, if synergies aren't large enough. In order to test this idea we compare abnormal returns for completed deals and for withdrawn deals. We use the fact that abnormal returns from withdrawn deals do not incorporate the value of synergies since they are not successful and therefore such potential synergies are never realized. Withdrawn or unsuccessful deals should only carry an information e¤ect, which should be negative for acquirers and positive for targets. Taking di¤erences in abnormal returns between successful and unsuccessfuld deals allows us to measure the value creation e¤ect, which should be positive for both parties. All this is con…rmed by the data. For instance, by looking at at long-window CARs, we …nd that the value creation e¤ect is 9 percent and 20 percent for acquirers and targets respectively, whereas the information e¤ect is 11 and +10 percent for acquirers and targets. This helps explain why the gains are so large for targets and slightly negative for acquirers, despite the fact that they might be "good" mergers.
We …nd that when proxying for the variables that might predict the probability of becoming an acquirer or a target, the estimation shows that the signs of the coe¢ cients are in line with the model. Importantly, GP provision is positively related to the likelihood of becoming a target in a friendly deal, con…rming the hypothesis. Our measures of relative merger gains to acquirers/targets increase its respective probability of becoming one. When controlling for other reasons stressed in the literature, we too …nd evidence of the misvaluation motive stressed by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) . Overvalued …rms (measured as …rms whose returns outperform the year/industry mean) tend to be acquirers, undervalued …rms tend to be targets, other things equal.
Golden parachutes increase premiums, when we measure premiums using cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, they a¤ect acquirer premiums more than target gains, from an statistical standpoint. A target with golden parachutes increases the acquiring …rm's cumulative abnormal returns by around 2% on average. For targets, this result can be higher (around 3.4%) but in most of the speci…cations the e¤ect vanishes in statistical terms. We also …nd that those variables proxying for the search component in mergers have a positive e¤ect on abnormal returns.
With respect to other controls, and in line with past studies, …rm size is the only …rm variable that consistently seems to matter.
The empirical literature in GPs usually focus on targets but if we follow our theoretical setup, we need to focus on both sides of the game, therefore in the abnormal returns regressions we include information from both companies (acquiring and acquired). We also use a di¤erent econometric approach, exploiting both the cross-section and time-series dimension of the data to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the …rm level. Panel data techniques are becoming more popular among empirical corporate …nance studies, helping overcome potential biases and the e¢ ciency of estimators (see Petersen (2006) ). We next review the empirical literature on golden parachutes.
Literature Review
Lambert and Larcker (1985) …nd a positive market reaction upon the announcement that the …rm will grant golden parachutes to their top executives for a sample of 57 …rms. They test two hypotheses. The IAH (Incentive Alignment Hypothesis) predicts a positive market reaction to GP adoption because shareholder interest is then protected during negotiations (note that this reason di¤ers from the one proposed in Martos-Vila (2006) where the alignment of incentives is ex-ante and not during negotiations). On the other hand, the Wealth Transfer Hypothesis (WTH) corresponds to the traditional view that GPs are used by managers to expropriate shareholder value (Manne (1965)), and should yield a negative market reaction. To test these hypotheses an event study is pursued, taking the event date as the date when GP adoption is …lled with the Securities Exchange Commission. They conclude that the lack of signi…cance of the coe¢ cients for the …rms with negative market reactions is evidence of little empirical support to the WTH.
Machlin, Choe and Miles (1993) examine the impact of GPs on the likelihood of a takeover subsequent to adoption, for a sample of …rms from 1975 to 1988. They …nd that the adoption of Golden Parachutes increases the likelihood of a successful takeover. Second they estimate that a $1 increase in GPs translates into a $10 increase in takeover premium.
Finally, The adoption of such contracts is associated with a larger frequency of multiple takeover bids. Hall and Anderson (1997) estimate a logit model to determine if GP adoption increases the probability of receiving a takeover bid. Their results indicate that the adoption of a golden parachute contract does not signi…cantly increase the probability of a …rm receiving a takeover bid. They also can't …nd a signi…cant relationship between GP size and market reaction. They conclude, however, that the signi…cantly positive relationship between the size of the golden parachute relative to the …rm's market value and market reaction of many of the …rms is indicative of an incentive alignment perception of stockholders.
Finally, Lefanowicz, Robinson and Smith (2000) regress abnormal stock returns for acquisitions on variables including managerial incentives, the value of GP payments and the interaction between GPs and management incentives. They …nd that management incentives (lost salary/ownership at pre-acquisition announcement value) a¤ect positively target shareholder gains. The …nd that the GP dummy is not signi…cant. The interaction between GPs and management incentives is negative and signi…cant, indicating, according to the authors, that GPs serve to mitigate the e¤ect of management incentives. However, since the coe¢ cients of management incentives and the interaction term tend to cancel each other, this suggests that, on average, GP provisions tend to o¤set the e¤ects of lost salary. This paper di¤ers from Machlin et al. (1993) in that instead of considering the likelihood of a takeover we estimate the likelihood of becoming an acquirer and a target in a friendly merger separately, using a more comprehensive dataset from 1990 to 2005. Given the lack of data regarding the exact amount of the parachute, we measure how much the premium changes by when such contracts exist versus not. Our paper di¤ers from Hall and Anderson (1997) in that we do …nd that GPs a¤ect the likelihood of becoming a target. We also do …nd some weak evidence on the e¤ect of GPs and the market reaction at the announcement of the deal. Finally, in contrast with Lefanowicz et al. (2000) we do …nd a direct association between GPs and premiums, especially for acquirer gains and more so than for target gains.
Model and Hypotheses
Martos-Vila (2007) proposes a general framework to analyze merger-related decisions in a friendly context. The result of modelling explicitly the choice whether to become a potential acquirer or target is the obtention of closed-form solutions for the probability of becoming either of them. Given the market equilibrium perspective of such approach, this probability coincides with the mass of potential targets and acquirers in a steady-state equilibrium of the market for corporate control.
To be more precise, recalling Proposition 1 in MV we …nd that the probability of being a potential acquirer is given by
In words, choosing to be a potential acquirer is positively related with the relative gains accruing to them ( ) and negatively related with search frictions. Let us analyze both e¤ects in more depth.
First, the relative gains to acquiring …rms are the product of their relative bargaining power ( ) and a measure of the relative gains from merging as opposed to remaining a stand-alone company. Such measure is the ratio between net operational synergies (net of remuneration to both managers: B to the acquirer and the golden parachute R T to the target) and a measure of the cost of searching for synergies/targets: pf . This opportunity cost captures the idea that a potential acquirer forgoes (versus a potential target) improving the operational side of the …rm with the hope that the merger will bring such increase in pro…tability, therefore the ex-ante operational pro…t ‡ow for the target is larger than that for the acquirer in the amount pf: The larger this opportunity cost is the less inclined the …rm to searching for targets. In sum, the larger the relative gains to merging the larger the likelihood a …rm will search for a target. The other element mentioned was the bargaining power. Intuitively, the larger the potential acquirer's bargaining power ( ) the larger the probability of being one. This is so because the gains to a party are positively related to their own bargaining power during the price negotiation.
Second, the probability of being an acquirer depends on how di¢ cult it is to …nd synergies/targets: the lower u is, the lower will be. Here, measures the exogenous probability of …nding a target whereas u is a measure of the mass of …rms subject to acquisitions. The more …rms in the market, the easier should be to …nd one to merge with. 1 Finally, interest rates decrease the current value of future claims (real option of merging) driving the probability of being an acquirer down, other things equal.
We summarize the expected signs of the coe¢ cients, based on the partial derivatives in Table 1 below. Note that since,by de…nition the probability of being a potential target is inversely related to the probability of being a potential acquirer, the signs are the exact opposite. Table 1 Acquirer/Target Decision. Signs of Partial Derivatives We summarize this in the …rst hypothesis below.
Hypothesis 1. The probability of becoming an acquirer depends positively on its relative bargaining power, the value of synergies, the number of …rms available to being acquired and how easy it is to …nd synergies/targets. It depends negatively on the dollar amount of the golden parachute contract as well as the empire building motive of the acquirer management (which coincides with her remuneration), the opportunity cost of searching as measured by the pro…tability di¤ erential and interest rates. The signs are reversed for a potential target.
In order to test Hypothesis 1 we need to specify an econometric model suitable to the theoretical predictions. A convenient linear approximation of equation (1) gives us the following econometric speci…cation:
where " it jX it N (X it ; 2 j ) and X it is a vector of …rm and time-especi…c characteristics.
A second econometric model used departs from the linear speci…cation and assumes instead a logistic distribution of the regressors (aka Logit Model):
where is the Gaussian distribution.
Both models are estimated using …xed-e¤ects to control for unobserved …rm-level heterogeneity (as well as time …xed-e¤ects), therefore exploiting the panel-data properties of the database.
The theoretical model also provides the reader with closed-form solutions for the …rm value of targets and acquirers before and after the acquisition. To be more precise, the change in value on announcement of the merger is, for a typical acquirer and target,
The valuation formulas for the deal are very intuitive. It is obvious that the relative strength in negotiating should a¤ect positively one's gain from merging since the …rm is able to extract a larger portion of the cake but should not a¤ect total gains from the deal.
Gains, as measured by abnormal returns, are proportional to the net value of synergies.
The value of synergies is the excess pro…tability that comes from combining both …rms, so it depends positively on how pro…table the merged entity is thought to be but negatively on the pre-merger pro…tability and management compensation costs associated with merging:
golden parachutes (R T ) and increased salary for the acquirer (B). On the other hand, the probability of …nding synergies/targets and the pool of …rms subject to be bought out (which are inverse measures of search frictions) a¤ect the gains as well. However its sign is ambiguous since depends on them as well. 2 This is summarized in the following hypothesis and table.
Hypothesis 2. The acquirer gain from merging, as measured by the change in value before and after the deal depends positively on the relative bargaining power and the value of net synergies. The same applies to the target. The net value of synergies depends on the di¤ erence between post-merger pro…tability and pre-merger pro…tability plus management compensation costs. Search frictions as measured by and u also a¤ ect merger premiums. This is summarized in Table 2 below. Table 2 Signs for the E¤ects on Merger Gains
Basic Model Target Acquirer Joint
Acquirer's bargaining power: + 0 Operational synergies:
Arrival rate of meetings: += += +=
Mass of non-merged …rms: u += += +=
Rate of time preference: r
The model is also used to explain how, on average, acquirer returns might be negative (as empirical studies show.) In a more general model, abnormal returns are then the sum of two e¤ects, a value creation e¤ect similar to (2) and (3) and an information e¤ect added. Such information e¤ect reveals two things: that a …rm was a potential acquirer and therefore was ex-ante paying less attention to the operational side of the company and also that the future possibilities of merging might be exhausted. This information might be negative for acquirers (Proposition 5) and is positive for targets. We choose to test this implication using a "quasi-natural" experiment. In particular, we exploit the abnormal returns around the announcement of failed mergers, deals that are withdrawn. If we believe in the decomposition of abnormal returns just explained (between a synergy e¤ect and an information e¤ect), abnormal returns corresponding to withdrawn deals should only contain an information e¤ect, since synergies are never realized. This is likely to be the case when the window that measures such abnormal returns is long enough for the market to incorporate the fact that the deal is most likely going to fail. By looking at the di¤erence between successful and unsuccessful deals we can therefore disentangle both e¤ects. We summarize this in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. Abnormal returns from merging can be decomposed in two e¤ ects:
value creation and information. The value creation e¤ ect is positive for both acquirers and targets. However, the information e¤ ect is positive for targets and negative for acquirers.
Finally, one of the key features of MV is the potential con ‡ict of interest between managers and shareholders regarding acquisitions. As a result, an optimal contract arises that calls for the provision of golden parachutes. This optimality result posits that all …rms should adopt a golden parachute. In relation to this, it is also shown that providing GPs increases merger gains, precisely because they act as a barrier to merge, allowing only the most pro…table deals to go through. In order to test this result we use the fact that not all …rms provide GPs, even though the percentage of public …rms providing such compensation contracts has increased a lot during the last decade. Given that there are some …rms that do not provide GPs a natural test of these results is to compare M&A premiums for …rms that provide golden parachutes and those who do not. If both propositions hold, we should observe a positive coe¢ cient for the provision dummy. This is summarized in the last of our hypotheses (see below) and concludes this section. We next describe the data used to test them.
Hypothesis 4. Given the optimality of providing golden parachutes and the fact that they act as a barrier to merge, …rms providing them should enjoy larger abnormal returns from a deal.
Data
We use data from 1990 to 2006 from four di¤erent sources. First, we identify merger announcements using the Securities Data Company's (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions
Database. We choose deals where both the target and acquirer are U.S. public …rms (i.e., listed in one of the three stock markets) and the acquisition takes the form of a merger, as opposed to the acquisition of partial interests, remaining interests or assets. We also require the deal value to be at least $1 million. Finally, since the theory that inspires this paper is best suited for friendly mergers we remove those deals classi…ed as hostile by SDC. (1993)). We only report the results corresponding to the 3-factor model, which seems to be the more commonly used. Also from the CRSP database is the annualized risk-free rate in the month in which the …rms'…scal year ended or in which the merger announcement occured, depending on which one applies. Another interest rate used is the annual market yield on U.S. Treasury securities at constant maturity (7 years) from the Federal Reserve Board.
In order to account for …rm and industry characteristics, especially performance, we use COMPUSTAT. These variables have been used extensively in the literature (see, for instance, Rhodes-Kropf et a. (2003) and Schwert (2000)) 3 . The variables used are:
Return on Assets (ROA), measured as the ratio of Income before extraordinary items available for common equity to the book value of assets (compustat items 237/6).
Liquidity, measured as ratio of the di¤erence between current assets (d4) and current liabilities to the market value of assets for the prior …scal year (compustat items (4-5)/(24*25+6-60-74).
M/B, measured as the ratio of the market value of equity over its book value (compustat items 24*25/60).
Size, measured as the log of equity capitalization for the prior …scal year (compustat items 24*25).
Number of …rms in the industry, measured as the count of …rms in the primary Fama-French industry the …rm belongs to.
So far then, we use information from three di¤erent sources. Schwert (2000) documents that performance measures tend to be higher for the sample with complete data, as well as size and that they have lower D/E ratios. Therefore, as Schwert points out, one needs to be "careful in extrapolating the …ndings to smaller, less prosperous target …rms" (Schwert (2000) ).
Yet two more databases are used in order to test our hypotheses. One is the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which publishes listings of corporate-governance provisions for individual …rms. These data are derived from a variety of public sources, including corporate bylaws and charters, proxy statements, annual reports, as well as 10-K and 10-Q documents …lled with the SEC. Our analysis uses all …rms in the IRRC universe. According to Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) it covers most of the valueweighted market: even in 1990 it tracked more than 93 percent of the total capitalization of the combined NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq markets. We use a variety of di¤erent variables, but especially:
Golden Parachutes, severance agreements that provide cash and non-cash compensation to senior executives upon an event such as termination, demotion or resignation following a change in corporate control.
Severance agreements, some source of compensation not contingent upon a change in control.
Poison Pills, which provide their holders with special rights in the case they are triggered. Typical poison pills give the target's stockholders the right to purchase stock in the target or the bidder's company at a steep discount, making the target unattractive or diluting the acquirer's voting power.
Antigreenmail, a provision sought to discourage the accumulation of large blocks of stock.
Finally, some further management compensation is included in the CAR regressions, such as salary, bonus and total compensation. This controls are necessary in order to capture some unobserved management characteristics (that is, our B variable in the theoretical model.) We use ExecuComp as the source for the management compensation data.
Methodology and Results

Measuring Search and Firm Performance
A key issue that one faces is how to capture some of the variables contained in the model,
given the direct unobservability of some of them. First, to measure the part of total net synergies captured by one of the sides in a deal we use an aggregate measure: the average acquirer (target) cumulative abnormal return for the whole sample of deals at any given year or quarter (Avg Gains). With this measure we hope to proxy for the unobservability of both the relative bargaining power and the value of operational synergies and avoid endogeneity problems since it is a cross-section average.
In order to measure u, the number of …rms subject to acquisitions (a measure of market "thickness"), we count the number of …rms in the industry, using the 48 Fama-French industry classi…cation. 4 Aside from u, the Poison arrival rate of potential targets ( ) further captures search frictions. We need to come up with other variables that might in ‡uence the likelihood of a merger happening. For that purpose, we construct a measure of Proximity. This measure is conceptually two-dimensional. The two dimensions are geography and operational relatedness. The former is measured using the city and state of the company's headquarter: two points if target and acquirer belong to the same city and state, one if they only belong to the same state (but not the same city) and zero if they belong to di¤erent states. The operational proximity is measured using a business segment index. Essentially, for …rm j, the index for industry i is valued at one if the …rm j operates in that industry. We then, for each industry, multiply the acquirer's and the target's index, and we add up this pairwise multiplicative terms. The larger the sum is the more business segments the two companies operate commonly. Apart from the proximity measures we use the dummies separately in some of the econometric estimations. As Figure 1 
To measure the pre-merger (or ex-ante) pro…tability of assets we use di¤erent measures, such as the return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) or sales growth. 5 As we mentioned earlier, we also need to quantify the opportunity cost of searching for targets/synergies pf; that is, the fact that searching for synerges reduces the current profitability of assets: In order to do so, we calculate the deviations of a …rm's ROA with respect to the mean industry-year ROA (di¤ erence ROA). In the theory, we assumed that targets have relatively larger pro…tability measures due to their focus on the operational performance of the …rm (instead of trying to increase pro…tability via acquisitions.) Therefore a positive di¤erence in ROA with respect to the mean should a¤ect positively the probability of becoming a target but negatively the probability of becoming an acquirer (higher opportunity cost). This variable is also used in Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2006) in order to capture management ability.
We use two sets of controls. On the one hand, we acknowledge the fact that past merger decisions might a¤ect the current decision to merge: the existence of the so-called serial or frequent acquirers is well known. Not only the number of completed acquisitions in the past might potentially explain in part the decision of acquiring yet again, but also the existence of past hostile and withdrawn acquisitions might be indicative of a future acquisition. Finally, if the …rm was recently acquired, it seems unlikely that it is going to bid for a target the year after. On the target side the reasoning is similar. One would expect that the probability of becoming a target increases if there is a past withdrawn hostile attempt to buy that company, or that given that it was bought recently (in the past year) it is not likely that it is going to be bought anytime soon. Finally, one can think that attempting to buy a …rm and not being able exposes the company itself to be the object of an acquisition by some other company, especially if the company's reason to have failed in the attempt to buy is due to incompetent management. All these hypotheses are tested and con…rmed by the estimations summarized in Table 3 , as we will see.
Another set of controls are …rm-related and have been used in prior studies. parachutes, supermajority rules to approve the merger, severance payments, silver parachutes and secret ballots. Failing to include these measures could yield biased estimates of the golden parachute e¤ect, to the extend that these antitakeover provisions might be positively correlated with the provision of GPs.
Estimating the Target/Acquirer Decision
We start evaluating the decision of whether to become a potential target or acquirer, that is, Hypothesis 1. In order to estimate and 1 we use panel-data discrete-choice models that control for unobserved heterogeneity at the …rm level (by using a …xed-e¤ect estimator). In Table 3 , we show the results of such estimations in the case of a linear probability model with autocorrelated disturbances and Table 4 shows the result of the (non-linear) logistic probability model. We highlight the main results next.
First, the probability of being an acquirer in a friendly merger increases if the company was an unsuccessful hostile acquirer in the past year (see # Acquired_h_w ) but decreases with the number of acquisitions in the past year (#_Acquired_f_c). There is also evidence that …rms that outperformed, in returns, the year/industry average are more likely to acquire, in line with the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) motive (see Table 4 ). Also, larger …rms are relatively more likely to become an acquirer, the coe¢ cient is signi…cant across speci…cations at a 1% level of con…dence. But size also a¤ects positively the probability of becoming a target. On can conclude that larger …rms are morel likely to engage in acquisitions, other things equal. 6 The Liquidity variable has a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the probability of acquiring in the linear and logit probability models, more liquid …rms tend to acquire.
This result is also intuitive and would support the idea that some …rms try to merge in order to use "excess" cash ‡ows from the …rm.
The di¤erence in ROA with respect to the industry/year average also has the expected negative sign. The more the current productivity of …rm's assets, the less likely the …rm will acquire. This captures the idea that as the opportunity cost of searching for syner-gies increases (larger ROA when measured with respect to their peers) the likelihood of acquiring ( ) goes down. However it is not statistically signi…cant in any of the models reported. 7 More interestingly, the number of …rms in the industry a¤ects positively the likelihood of acquiring, as predicted by the model. This e¤ect appears to be equally strong in both models. Finally, the provision of golden parachutes has no signi…cant e¤ect on the likelihood of acquiring.
Let us now comment on the target likelihood estimation. First, the larger the current pro…tability of the …rm (as measured by comparing the company's ROA with respect to the indsutry/year average) the more likely the …rm will be a target. This captures the other side of the coin of the result for acquirers and again supports the idea that in friendly mergers, targets tend to have larger pro…tability measures, as suggested by the theory.
However, the statistical signi…cance is weak (see Table 4 .) The number of times the …rm was unsuccessfully targeted in a hostile way (# Target_h_w) in the past year a¤ects positively the probability of becoming the target of a successful and friendly deal. The same sign e¤ect as the number of past unsuccessful and hostile attempts to acquire (same but smaller e¤ect than for acquirers). This implies, when deals are hostile and unsuccesful, a natural next step is to try approaching the acquisition in a friendly way. Unsuccesful hostile deals appear to be good predictors for future friendly deals. As it is the case with acquirers, the past number of times the …rm was successfully or unsuccessfully friendly targeted a¤ects negatively the current likelihood of being a target in a friendly deal (see variables # Target_f_w and # Target_h_w in Table 3 for instance.) We also …nd evidence that the more undervalued the …rm is the more likely it is to become a target, this further supports Shleifer and Vishny (2003) motive. As we mentioned earlier, the size of the target a¤ects positively the probability of being one.
The number of …rms variable appears to be not signi…cant in all of the models estimated although the sign appears to be the same as the one predicted by the theory in most of the cases. The proxy for ; the relative operational gains from merging has the right sign (positive) and it is sigin…cant at the 1 percent con…dence level for all models and speci…cations.
In the target analysis, however, the Golden Parachute dummy has a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient throughout the di¤erent speci…cations, in line with the model. For instance, using the linear probability model, providing GPs increases the conditional mean probability of becoming a target by around 2%.
In summary, we …nd that the results of our estimations do not contradict Hypothesis We start evaluating the e¤ect of golden parachutes. For that purpose, Table 5 shows a comparison of means and medians of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for acquirers, targets and both (acquirer plus target) for two window lengths (short and long.) The table
shows similar results for both mean and median comparisons. If we look at acquirer returns in the shorter window, they are larger (in this case less negative) when targets provide golden parachutes, however none of the tests shows a statistically signi…cant di¤erence in means or medians. For instance, the mean CAR for acquirers whose target provides
GPs is -1.9% whereas the mean CAR for acquiring …rms whose target does not provide a GP is -2.6%. When it comes to targets, the short-window statistics are indistinguishably di¤erent but the longer window results do show that CARs are larger for targets providing golden parachutes, the di¤erence being statistically signi…cant using both a t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The di¤erence in returns is economically signi…cant: it appears to be 8.7% and 10.4% in means and medians respectively.
A regression analysis is needed in order to further test and document the relation between GP provision and friendly M&A returns. As we already mentioned, the IRRC database only provides information on the existence of golden parachutes, but not on the amount of such compensation agreements. Hypothesis 2 claims that the dollar amount spent in golden parachutes should a¤ect negatively merger gains since it is a compensation cost; but providing them versus not should yield higher expected returns since they act as a barrier to merge and only better deals would go through. On the other hand, Hypothesis 3 tells us that golden parachutes are optimal in providing incentives. In fact it should be in the compensation package of every manager. If Hypotheses 2 and 3 hold, including a GP dummy in the CAR regressions would test such optimality result: acquisitions where the target provided golden parachutes to their management should experience larger gains, controlling for other relevant variables.
First, as in the case with hostile takeovers (See Schwert (2000)) we …nd evidence that target size is negatively related to target, acquirer and joint premiums, with negative e¤ects of 2, 4 and 6 percent respectively. The magnitudes of the e¤ects are very similar to Schwert (2000) . This would suggest that size is not necessarily a good way of capturing the bargaining power, since in that case the coe¢ cient should be positive. The acquirer's size does not appear to be signi…cant in any but one of the models (model 6.)
Secondly, there is some evidence that the acquirer's market/book is positively related to target premiums and target's market/book is negatively related to their own premiums (see model (3) and (4) in Table 6 ). Liquidity appears to be unrelated to CARs, the same with debt-to-equity ratios (not reported.) What appears to matter, in line with past research is the form of payment. We …nd that in friendly deals, target CARs are lower for deals where at least 75% is paid with stock (Stock dummy), but also those deals paid with at least 75% cash carry a discount. This would yield to the conclusion that targets bene…t more from deals where the form of payment is mixed. Finally if we look at joint CARs ( Table 7) we …nd that only the stock dummy is signi…cantly negative, again in line with past studies. The model predicts that past performance should be negatively related to merger premiums, since it represents an opportunity cost of merging. This is con…rmed in the estimations since target's ROA a¤ects negatively their own gains as well as joint gains as can be con…rmed by looking at Model 4 and 6 respectively (Tables 6 and 7.) Third, the golden parachute dummy has the expected positive sign in all the especi…ca-tions. It appears to be statistically signi…cant for acquirer premiums, but the signi…cance vanishes for the joint premium model and the target returns models. Moving from a target with no golden parachutes to a target that provides them increases acquirer returns 2 percent on average. The e¤ect seems then to be economically signi…cant as well.
The model also includes measures of the acquirer's management total compensation, hoping to capture some of the empire building e¤ect (B). The larger B is, the lower the premium. We do not …nd evidence of that in the regressions, as the coe¢ cient appears to be signi…cantly positive in Models 1 and 2 (see the variable Acq Compensation in those models.) This result is not completely surprising. To the extend that management compensation is linked to its ability, which is not included as a variable in the regressions, the coe¢ cient of total acquirer compensation could well be capturing management ability as well.
The variable proxying for net synergy gains to each party is not signi…cant in any model. This variable is the average of the acquirer's(target's) CAR across deals that were announced during the same quarter. We think that since the variable is an aggregate measure, it might be too noisy to capture the gains enjoyed by an individual acquirer, failing to yield signi…cance.
We next comment on the measures of the industry number of …rms (u) and the arrival rate of matches ( ; the likelihood of …ndind a match). The search proxy that we labeled with Proximity appears to be signi…cant at the 10 percent level in all models, with a positive sign. Other things equal, a marginal increase in proximity increases abnormal returns to acquirers by 1 percent, to targets by 3.5 percent and to both by around 4 percent. The other variable that appears signi…cant is Same State. In particular, its e¤ect is a positive 7 percent on joint abnormal returns. Also note that albeit not signi…cant, the Related Industry dummy e¤ect is negative. Note that this is not in line with the diversi…cation discount idea, since in that case the coe¢ cient should be positive: diversifying mergers, that is, those where target and acquirer belong to di¤erent industries are believed to have lower returns. Of course, it could be the case that there is no longer a diversi…cation discount but a diversi…cation premium for other reasons. In any case, the result does not contradict the theoretical model, given its lack of signi…cance and also because the search variables do not have a clear sign e¤ect in the theory.
Value-creation and Information Decomposition
The last test left is Hypothesis 3. Recall that according to the results and assumption of the theoretical framework, abnormal returns from merging can be decomposed in two e¤ects: value creation and information. The value creation e¤ect (driven by synergies)
is positive for both acquirers and targets. However, the information e¤ect is positive for targets and negative for acquirers. The information e¤ect was driven by the assymmetric information stemming from the moral hazard problem and the future prospects of merging.
As we mentioned earlier, we exploit the announcement e¤ects of failed deals to measure and decompose these two e¤ects. We do this by noting that withdrawn deals cannot incorporate in their abnormal returns any value creation since the synergies are never realized (this is more likely to be true in longer CAR windows.) By looking at the average CAR of a withdrawn deal we can measure the information e¤ect. By then taking di¤erences with respect to successful deals, we can as well isolate the value creation e¤ect. If the model is right the value creation e¤ect should be positive for both targets and acquirers, whereas the information e¤ect is negative for acquirers and positive for targets.
Using similar tests as the ones used when evaluating the e¤fects of golden parachutes in Table 5 , we …nd strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis. As we look at Table 8 , we …nd that the mean, median and non-parametric tests show that the di¤erence between successful and unsuccesful deals is signi…cant. Not only that, such di¤erence, which should measure the value creation e¤ect, is positive for both acquirers and targets, con…rming the hypothesis. It ranges from +0:5 to +9 percent for acquirers and from +7 to +20 percent for targets. The average information e¤ect (which is identi…ed by measuring the CARs for unsuccessful deals) ranges from 2 to 11 percent for acquirers and +10 to +18 percent for targets, again in line with the theory. This "quasi-natural" quanti…es both e¤ects, and we think that it helps explaining why acquirer stock price reactions are slightly negative despite the fact that the merger might have positive synergies, and this is because the (negative) information e¤ect more than o¤sets the value creation e¤ect.
Concluding Remarks
We have empirically assessed some of the hypotheses contained in some recent approaches to the market for corporate control. In summary we …nd consistency with the predictions.
We want to highlight that the predictions for the model regarding Golden Parachutes are con…rmed. First, the adoption of golden parachutes a¤ects positively the likelilhood of becoming the target in a friendly merger. And secondly, deals where targets are providing GPs seem to enjoy larger returns, especially for acquirers.
Search proxies seem to also matter in terms of likelihoods. The more …rms to buy the more likely a …rm will acquire, the less likely it will be targeted. Search proxies also a¤ect abnormal returns. In particular, our measure of proximity is positively related with acquirer, target and joint CARs.
According to the test used for hypothesis 3, we are able to measure the decomposition of abnormal returns in a value creation e¤ect and an information e¤ect, as suggested by the theory. We …nd, as expected, that the value creation is positive for both parties, but that the information e¤ect hurts acquirers yet it bene…ts targets. When adding them up this helps explaining why target abnormal returns are so positive and acquirer returns are slightly negative, on average, despite creating value.
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